

Secure On-Off Transmission Design with Channel Estimation Errors

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Abstract—Physical layer security has recently been regarded as an emerging technique to complement and improve the communication security in future wireless networks. The current research and development in physical layer security is often based on the ideal assumption of perfect channel knowledge or the capability of variable-rate transmissions. In this work, we study the secure transmission design in more practical scenarios by considering channel estimation errors at the receiver and investigating both fixed-rate and variable-rate transmissions. Under the assumption of quasi-static fading channels, we design secure on-off transmission schemes to maximize the throughput subject to a constraint on secrecy outage probability. For systems with given and fixed encoding rates, we show how the optimal on-off transmission thresholds and the achievable throughput vary with the change in the knowledge of the eavesdropper's channel. In particular, our design covers the interesting case where the eavesdropper also has channel estimation errors. For systems in which the encoding rates are controllable parameters to design, we further derive both a non-adaptive and an adaptive rate transmission schemes by jointly optimizing the encoding rates and the on-off transmission thresholds to maximize the throughput of secure transmissions.

Index Terms—Physical layer security, channel estimation error, on-off transmission, secrecy outage probability.

I. INTRODUCTION

The broadcast nature of wireless networks makes communication security a critical issue, especially when the information transmitted is important and private. Cryptographic technologies are traditionally used to increase the wireless communication security. On the other hand, physical layer security has been widely regarded as a complement to cryptographic technologies in future networks. Wyner's pioneering work introduced the wiretap channel model as a basic framework for physical layer security [2], which was extended to broadcast channels with confidential messages described by Csiszár and Körner in [3]. These early works have led to a significant amount of recent research activities taking the fading characteristics of wireless channels into account. One of the key features in providing physical layer security is that the channel state information (CSI) of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper often needs to be known by the transmitter to enable secure encoding and advanced signaling. In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the impact of the uncertainty in the CSI of both legitimate and eavesdropping links at the transmitter, e.g., [4–8].

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Usually, the CSI is obtained at the receiver by channel estimation during pilot transmission. Then, a feedback link (if available) is used to send the CSI to the transmitter. Hence, the accuracy of the channel estimation at the receiver affects the quality of CSI at the transmitter. In the literature of physical layer security, most existing studies assumed that the legitimate receiver has perfect channel estimation. Clearly, this assumption is not very practical, since the channel estimation problem generally is not error-free. In principle, the channel estimation error exists at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. Assuming perfect estimation at the eavesdropper is more reasonable from the secure transmission design point of view, since it is often difficult or impossible for the transmitter to know the accuracy of the eavesdropper's channel estimate. Nevertheless, in scenarios where the eavesdropper is just an ordinary user of the network whose performance and other information can be tracked by the transmitter, e.g., [9–11], the consideration of imperfect channel estimation at the eavesdropper becomes relevant. Previous works that study the physical layer security problems considering the imperfect channel estimation at the receiver can be found in [12–14], where [12, 13] considered the channel estimation error at the legitimate receiver and [14] considered the channel estimation error at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.

Specifically, Taylor et al. presented the impact of the legitimate receiver's channel estimation error on the performance of an eigenvector-based jamming technique in [12]. Their research showed that the ergodic secrecy rate provided by the jamming technique decreases rapidly as the channel estimation error increases. Zhou and McKay analyzed the optimal power allocation of the artificial noise for the secure transmission considering the impact of imperfect CSI at the legitimate receiver in [13]. They found that it is wise to create more artificial noise by compromising on the transmit power of information-bearing signals when the CSI is imperfectly obtained. Liu et al. [14] adopted the secrecy beamforming scheme to investigate the joint design of training and data transmission signals for wiretap channels. They derived the ergodic secrecy rate for practical systems with imperfect channel estimations at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, and found the optimal tradeoff between the energy used for training and data signals based on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate.

The aforementioned works in [12–14] all used the ergodic secrecy rate to characterize the performance limits of systems. The ergodic secrecy rate is an appropriate secrecy measure for systems in which the encoded messages span sufficient channel realizations to capture the ergodic features of the fading chan-

nel [15]. In addition, the works in [12–14] implicitly assumed variable-rate transmission strategies where the encoding rates are adaptively chosen according to the instantaneous channel gains¹. In practice, communication systems sometimes prefer non-adaptive rate transmission to reduce complexity and applications like video streams in multimedia often require fixed encoding rates². Thus, variable-rate transmission strategies are not always feasible.

In this paper, we study the design problem of secure transmission in quasi-static slow fading channels considering the channel estimation error at the receiver. An outage-based characterization is adopted to measure the secure communication performance. We develop throughput-maximizing secure on-off transmission schemes for the scenarios where the encoding rates are either fixed or to be optimally chosen. In the scenarios where the encoding rates can be optimally chosen, we further consider both non-adaptive and adaptive rate transmissions. Here the secure on-off transmission scheme is adopted from [15, 16] and is essential to control the secrecy performance for systems with fixed encoding rates.

The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.

- 1) We consider quasi-static slow fading channels and use an outage-based formulation to study the secure transmission design with channel estimation errors at the receiver side. This is different from the previous works in [12–14] which used the ergodic secrecy rate as the performance measure.
- 2) We develop throughput-maximizing secure on-off transmission schemes with fixed encoding rates for different scenarios distinguished on whether or not there is channel estimation error at the eavesdropper, and whether or not the transmitter has the estimated channel quality fed back from the eavesdropper. Our analytical and numerical results show how the optimal design and the achievable throughput vary with the change in the channel knowledge assumptions.
- 3) For systems in which the encoding rates are controllable parameters to design, we jointly optimize the encoding rates and the on-off transmission thresholds to maximize the throughput of secure transmissions. Both non-adaptive and adaptive rate transmissions are considered. Note that none of the previous works on physical layer security considering the channel estimation error has explicitly involved the rate parameters as part of the design problem.
- 4) We also analyze how the training (pilot) power affects the achievable throughput of secure transmissions, since the accuracy of the channel estimation depends on the pilot power. One interesting finding is that, in the sce-

nario where both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper obtain imperfect channel estimates, increasing the pilot power for more accurate channel estimation can harm the throughput of the secure transmission even if the pilot power is obtained for free.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the system model and the assumptions on channel knowledge. Section III analyzes the secure on-off transmission design for systems with fixed encoding rates. Section IV develops two joint rate and on-off transmission designs depending on whether the encoding rates are non-adaptive or adaptive. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.

II. SYSTEM MODEL

We consider a wireless communication system in which the transmitter, Alice, wants to send confidential information to the intended user, Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Alice, Bob and Eve are assumed to have a single antenna each. We consider the scenario where both Bob and Eve are mobile users served by the base station, Alice. In order to secure the transmission to Bob against Eve, Alice tracks the channel qualities of both mobile stations by asking them to feed back their estimated instantaneous channel qualities through error-free feedback links³.

We assume slow-fading channels and adopt the block fading model [17], where the channel gains remain constant over a block of symbols and change independently from one block to the next. We further assume that the block-wise transmission is adopted. At the start of each block, pilot symbols are transmitted to enable channel estimation at the receiver. Then, both Bob and Eve estimate their channels and feed the estimated channel qualities back to Alice. Finally, the data symbols are transmitted. The data symbol transmitted by Alice is denoted by d . The transmission power of the data symbols is normalized so that $E\{|d|^2\} = 1$, where $E\{\cdot\}$ is the expectation operation. The pilot symbol used to estimate the channel gain is denoted by t . For simplicity, we assume that the pilot transmission time and the feedback time is very short compared with the transmission time of data such that the overhead of pilot transmission and feedback has negligible influence on the overall throughput. We further assume that the pilot power can be different from the data power. The ratio of pilot power to data power is denoted by

$$\alpha = \frac{E\{|t|^2\}}{E\{|d|^2\}} = E\{|t|^2\}. \quad (1)$$

Since $E\{|d|^2\} = 1$, we also call α as the normalized pilot power (normalized by data power) in this paper. The received symbols at Bob and Eve are, respectively, given by

$$y_b = \sqrt{P_b} h_b x + n_b, \quad (2)$$

$$y_e = \sqrt{P_e} h_e x + n_e, \quad (3)$$

¹The system achieving the ergodic secrecy rate has the implicit assumption of the variable-rate transmission, which is very different from traditional ergodic fading scenarios without the secrecy consideration. A detailed explanation can be found in [15].

²In this paper, systems with non-adaptive rates are different from systems with fixed rates. The systems with fixed rates indicate that the encoding rates are already given and hence cannot be chosen freely. The systems with non-adaptive rates indicate that the encoding rates can be chosen in the design process but are constant for all message transmissions.

³Note that only the channel quality, which is a real number as opposed to the complex channel coefficient, is required to be fed back to Alice. In this paper, we assume a high-quality feedback link with negligible quantization errors.

where h_b and h_e denote the channel gains from Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve, respectively, each having a zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution with unit variance, i.e., $\mathcal{CN}(0, 1)$. The additive white noise with complex Gaussian distribution $\mathcal{CN}(0, 1)$ at Bob and Eve are denoted by n_b and n_e . The transmitted signal x can be a data symbol, d , or a pilot symbol, t . Since the data power is normalized to unity, P_b and P_e represent the average data signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at Bob and Eve without the consideration of channel uncertainty, respectively. Thus, P_b and P_e are parameters that indicate the general channel conditions between the transmitter and the receivers. For example, $P_b > P_e$ may indicate that the distance from Alice to Bob is smaller than the distance from Alice to Eve. In addition, it is assumed that P_b and P_e are known at Alice.

A. Channel Estimation

We assume that Bob's channel is estimated by the MMSE estimator during pilot transmission. The estimation of Bob's channel gain and the estimation error are denoted by \hat{h}_b and \tilde{h}_b , respectively. Thus,

$$h_b = \hat{h}_b + \tilde{h}_b, \quad (4)$$

where \hat{h}_b and \tilde{h}_b have zero-mean complex Gaussian distributions. In fact, $|\hat{h}_b|^2$ is what Bob feeds back to Alice as the estimated instantaneous channel quality. The orthogonality principle implies $E\{|h_b|^2\} = E\{|\hat{h}_b|^2\} + E\{|\tilde{h}_b|^2\}$. According to [18], the variance of channel estimation error is given by

$$\beta_b = E\{|\tilde{h}_b|^2\} = \frac{1}{1 + \alpha P_b T_t}, \quad (5)$$

where T_t is the length of pilot transmission. In this paper, it is assumed that $T_t = 1$. Hence the effect of channel training is solely characterized by the normalized pilot power, α . For convenience, we let $\hat{\gamma}_b = P_b |\hat{h}_b|^2$ and $\tilde{\gamma}_b = P_b |\tilde{h}_b|^2$, each having an exponential distribution given by

$$f_{\hat{\gamma}_b}(\hat{\gamma}_b) = \frac{1}{P_b(1 - \beta_b)} \exp\left(-\frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{P_b(1 - \beta_b)}\right), \quad \hat{\gamma}_b > 0, \quad (6)$$

$$f_{\tilde{\gamma}_b}(\tilde{\gamma}_b) = \frac{1}{P_b\beta_b} \exp\left(-\frac{\tilde{\gamma}_b}{P_b\beta_b}\right), \quad \tilde{\gamma}_b > 0. \quad (7)$$

We assume that Bob uses the estimated channel gain for data detection. Then, the actual instantaneous SNR at Bob can be written as [19]

$$\gamma_b = \frac{P_b |\hat{h}_b|^2}{P_b |\tilde{h}_b|^2 + 1} = \frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{\tilde{\gamma}_b + 1}. \quad (8)$$

We assume that Eve's channel is also estimated by the MMSE estimator. The estimation of Eve's channel gain and the estimation error are denoted by \hat{h}_e and \tilde{h}_e , respectively. Thus,

$$h_e = \hat{h}_e + \tilde{h}_e, \quad (9)$$

where \hat{h}_e and \tilde{h}_e have zero-mean complex Gaussian distributions. In fact, $|\hat{h}_e|^2$ is what Eve is required to feed back to Alice

as the estimated instantaneous channel quality. The orthogonality principle implies $E\{|h_e|^2\} = E\{|\hat{h}_e|^2\} + E\{|\tilde{h}_e|^2\}$. In addition, the variance of channel estimation error is given by

$$\beta_e = E\{|\tilde{h}_e|^2\} = \frac{1}{1 + \alpha P_e T_t}, \quad (10)$$

where we assume $T_t = 1$. Similar, we let $\hat{\gamma}_e = P_e |\hat{h}_e|^2$ and $\tilde{\gamma}_e = P_e |\tilde{h}_e|^2$, each having an exponential distribution given by

$$f_{\hat{\gamma}_e}(\hat{\gamma}_e) = \frac{1}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)} \exp\left(-\frac{\hat{\gamma}_e}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right), \quad \hat{\gamma}_e > 0, \quad (11)$$

$$f_{\tilde{\gamma}_e}(\tilde{\gamma}_e) = \frac{1}{P_e\beta_e} \exp\left(-\frac{\tilde{\gamma}_e}{P_e\beta_e}\right), \quad \tilde{\gamma}_e > 0. \quad (12)$$

With the MMSE channel estimation, the actual instantaneous SNR for data detection at Eve can be written as

$$\gamma_e = \frac{P_e |\hat{h}_e|^2}{P_e |\tilde{h}_e|^2 + 1} = \frac{\hat{\gamma}_e}{\tilde{\gamma}_e + 1}. \quad (13)$$

It should be noted that in principle Eve is able to further improve the channel estimation by performing joint channel and data detection, while Alice has no mechanism to tell if this is the case. As a robust approach for achieving secrecy, Alice may assume the worst case scenario where Eve perfectly knows her own channel. Then, the actual instantaneous SNR at Eve is $\gamma_e = P_e |h_e|^2$, which has an exponential distribution given by

$$f_{\gamma_e}(\gamma_e) = \frac{1}{P_e} \exp\left(-\frac{\gamma_e}{P_e}\right), \quad \gamma_e > 0. \quad (14)$$

B. Channel Knowledge Assumptions

As mentioned before, Alice asks both Bob and Eve to feed back their estimated instantaneous channel qualities after the pilot transmission phase. Since Bob is the intended user, we simply assume that Alice has and trusts the feedback from Bob with the knowledge of $\hat{\gamma}_b = P_b |\hat{h}_b|^2$ as Bob's estimated instantaneous SNR. The actual instantaneous SNR at Bob is given in (8). However, Eve is an eavesdropper, and may not cooperate with Alice. Hence, Alice may not obtain or trust the feedback information from Eve. In this work, we specifically investigate the following three scenarios with different assumptions on the channel knowledge:

- Scenario 1: Alice has and trusts the feedback from Eve, knowing $\hat{\gamma}_e = P_e |\hat{h}_e|^2$ as the estimate of the instantaneous SNR at Eve. Eve uses the MMSE channel estimate \hat{h}_e for data detection, and hence the actual instantaneous SNR at Eve is given in (13).
- Scenario 2: Alice has and trusts the feedback from Eve, knowing $\hat{\gamma}_e = P_e |\hat{h}_e|^2$ as the estimate of the instantaneous SNR at Eve. Eve perfectly knows her own channel, and the actual instantaneous SNR at Eve is $\gamma_e = P_e |h_e|^2$.
- Scenario 3: Alice does not have or trust Eve's feedback, and have no knowledge about Eve's instantaneous channel. Eve perfectly knows her own channel, and the actual instantaneous SNR at Eve is $\gamma_e = P_e |h_e|^2$.

In fact, the three scenarios above can also be interpreted as follows. Scenario 1 represents the case where Eve is exactly identical to other mobile users. Scenario 2 generally represents the case where Alice has partial information about Eve's channel gain, while allowing Eve to have perfect knowledge on her own channel. Scenario 3 is valid for the case where Alice has no feedback from Eve. This scenario is perhaps the most practical one with current communication protocols where the channel feedback is only obtained from the intended receiver. Scenario 3 is also a robust approach for secrecy that allows Eve to have malicious behaviors, e.g., feeding wrong information back to Alice.

C. Secure Encoding

We consider the widely-adopted wiretap code [2] for confidential message transmissions. There are two rate parameters, namely, the codeword transmission rate, R_b , and the confidential information rate, R_s . The positive rate difference $R_e = R_b - R_s$ is the cost to provide secrecy against the eavesdropper. A length M wiretap code is constructed by generating 2^{MR_b} codewords $x^M(w, v)$ of length M , where $w = 1, 2, \dots, 2^{MR_s}$ and $v = 1, 2, \dots, 2^{M(R_b - R_s)}$. For each message index w , we randomly select v from $\{1, 2, \dots, 2^{M(R_b - R_s)}\}$ with uniform probability and transmit the codeword $x^M(w, v)$. From [2, 20], perfect secrecy cannot be achieved when $R_e < C_e$, where C_e denotes Eve's channel capacity, $C_e = \log_2(1 + \gamma_e)$. Also, Bob is unable to decode the received codewords correctly when $R_b > C_b$, where C_b denotes Bob's channel capacity, $C_b = \log_2(1 + \gamma_b)$. Thus, given a pair of the rate choices, R_b and R_s , the secrecy outage probability [16], p_{so} , and the connection outage probability, p_{co} , are defined as

$$p_{so} = \Pr(C_e > R_b - R_s \mid \text{message transmission}), \quad (15)$$

$$p_{co} = \Pr(C_b < R_b \mid \text{message transmission}), \quad (16)$$

where $\Pr(\cdot)$ denotes the probability measure. Note that both outage probabilities are conditioned on the message transmission. The security level and the reliability level of a transmission scheme can then be measured by the secrecy outage probability and the connection outage probability, respectively.

III. ON-OFF TRANSMISSION DESIGN

In this section, we consider each of the three scenarios described in Section II and show how to design transmission schemes with good throughput performance, whilst satisfying certain constraints on the reliability and security levels. In particular, we consider the on-off transmission: Alice decides whether or not transmit according to the information about Bob and Eve's estimated instantaneous SNRs, i.e., transmission takes place when the estimated instantaneous SNR at Bob, $\hat{\gamma}_b$, is greater than a certain threshold, μ_b , and the estimated instantaneous SNR at Eve, $\hat{\gamma}_e$, is less than another threshold, μ_e , while transmission is suspended when $\hat{\gamma}_b \leq \mu_b$ or $\hat{\gamma}_e \geq \mu_e$. Having this on-off transmission scheme is necessary for improving the reliability and security performance. For example, when the channel condition from Alice to Bob is very bad, transmission may incur a large probability of decoding

error at Bob. Also, when the channel condition from Alice to Eve is very good, transmitting message may lead to a large probability that the confidential information is leaked to Eve. Since Bob and Eve's channels are independent with each other, it is reasonable to set two separate SNR thresholds on Bob and Eve's channels, respectively. In the scenario where Alice does not have or trust the feedback from Eve, there is no on-off SNR threshold on Eve's channel, μ_e , or equivalently $\mu_e = \infty$.

We assume that the encoding rates have already been designed such that both the codeword transmission rate, R_b , and the confidential information rate, R_s , are fixed⁴. The design problem is to maximize the throughput, η , subject to two constraints, one on the security performance and the other on the reliability performance, which can be written as

$$\max_{\mu_b, \mu_e} \quad \eta = p_{tx} (1 - p_{co}) R_s, \quad (17)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad p_{so} \leq \epsilon, p_{co} \leq \delta, \quad (18)$$

where $\epsilon \in [0, 1]$ and $\delta \in [0, 1]$ represent the minimum security and reliability requirements, p_{tx} denotes the probability of transmission due to the on-off transmission scheme. The controllable parameters to design are the two on-off SNR thresholds, μ_b and μ_e .

In what follows, we consider the transmission design in the three different scenarios described in Section II. For each scenario, the transmission probability, the connection outage probability and the secrecy outage probability are derived firstly. Then, the feasibility of security and reliability constraints is discussed. Here the feasibility of constraints means that the constraints can be satisfied whilst achieving a positive information rate. Finally, the solution of the optimization problem is given as a proposition.

A. Scenario One

Derivations of p_{tx} , p_{co} and p_{so} : Since Bob's estimated instantaneous SNR is independent with Eve's estimated instantaneous SNR, the probability of transmission in Scenario 1 is given as

$$\begin{aligned} p_{tx} &= \Pr(\hat{\gamma}_b > \mu_b) \Pr(\hat{\gamma}_e < \mu_e) \\ &= \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_b}{P_b(1 - \beta_b)}\right) \left(1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right)\right). \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

Since $\gamma_b \leq \hat{\gamma}_b$ according to (8) and Bob can decode the message without error only when $C_b \geq R_b$, it is wise to choose the value of μ_b satisfying

$$\log_2(1 + \mu_b) \geq R_b \Rightarrow \mu_b \geq 2^{R_b} - 1. \quad (20)$$

Then, the connection outage probability in Scenario 1 is given

⁴The problem considering the design of encoding rates where R_b and R_s can be optimally chosen is analyzed in Section IV.

by

$$\begin{aligned}
p_{co} &= \Pr(\log_2(1 + \gamma_b) < R_b \mid \hat{\gamma}_b > \mu_b) \\
&= \Pr\left(\log_2\left(1 + \frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{\tilde{\gamma}_b + 1}\right) < R_b \mid \hat{\gamma}_b > \mu_b\right) \\
&= \frac{\Pr(\mu_b < \hat{\gamma}_b < (2^{R_b} - 1)(\tilde{\gamma}_b + 1))}{\Pr(\hat{\gamma}_b > \mu_b)} \\
&= \exp\left(\frac{\mu_b}{P_b(1 - \beta_b)}\right) \\
&\quad \cdot \int_{\frac{\mu_b}{2^{R_b} - 1}}^{\infty} \left(\int_{\mu_b}^{(2^{R_b} - 1)(\tilde{\gamma}_b + 1)} f_{\hat{\gamma}_b}(\hat{\gamma}_b) d\hat{\gamma}_b \right) f_{\tilde{\gamma}_b}(\tilde{\gamma}_b) d\tilde{\gamma}_b \\
&= \frac{\beta_b(2^{R_b} - 1)}{1 + \beta_b(2^{R_b} - 2)} \exp\left(\frac{1}{P_b\beta_b} \left(1 - \frac{\mu_b}{2^{R_b} - 1}\right)\right). \quad (21)
\end{aligned}$$

The secrecy outage probability in Scenario 1 is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
p_{so} &= \Pr(C_e > R_b - R_s \mid \hat{\gamma}_e < \mu_e) \\
&= \Pr\left(\log_2\left(1 + \frac{\hat{\gamma}_e}{\tilde{\gamma}_e + 1}\right) > R_b - R_s \mid \hat{\gamma}_e < \mu_e\right) \\
&= \frac{\Pr((2^{R_b - R_s} - 1)(\tilde{\gamma}_e + 1) < \hat{\gamma}_e < \mu_e)}{\Pr(\hat{\gamma}_e < \mu_e)}. \quad (22)
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, if $\mu_e \leq 2^{R_b - R_s} - 1$, $p_{so} = 0$. This indicates that perfect secrecy is achievable in Scenario 1. Since $\hat{\gamma}_e \geq \gamma_e$ in Scenario 1, the estimate of Eve's instantaneous SNR, in fact, can be treated as an upper bound of the actual Eve's instantaneous SNR. Hence, Alice can make sure $C_e < R_b - R_s$ as long as $\mu_e \leq 2^{R_b - R_s} - 1$, and then the perfect secrecy is achieved.

On the other hand, if $\mu_e > 2^{R_b - R_s} - 1$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
p_{so} &= \frac{\int_0^{\frac{\mu_e}{2^{R_b - R_s} - 1}} \left(\int_{(2^{R_b - R_s} - 1)(\tilde{\gamma}_e + 1)}^{\mu_e} f_{\hat{\gamma}_e}(\hat{\gamma}_e) d\hat{\gamma}_e \right) f_{\tilde{\gamma}_e}(\tilde{\gamma}_e) d\tilde{\gamma}_e}{1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right)} \\
&= \frac{\frac{1 - \beta_e}{1 + \beta_e(2^{R_b - R_s} - 2)} \exp\left(-\frac{2^{R_b - R_s} - 1}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right) - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right)}{1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right)} \\
&\quad + \frac{\frac{\beta_e(2^{R_b - R_s} - 1)}{1 + \beta_e(2^{R_b - R_s} - 2)} \exp\left(\frac{1}{P_e} \left(\frac{1}{\beta_e} - \frac{\mu_e}{1 - \beta_e} - \frac{\mu_e}{\beta_e(2^{R_b - R_s} - 1)}\right)\right)}{1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right)}. \quad (23)
\end{aligned}$$

Feasibility of Constraints: From (21), p_{co} is a decreasing function of μ_b and

$$\lim_{\mu_b \rightarrow +\infty} p_{co} = 0. \quad (24)$$

Thus, the feasible range of the reliability constraint in Scenario 1 is given by

$$0 < \delta \leq 1. \quad (25)$$

According to (22), p_{so} is an increasing function of μ_e and $p_{so} = 0$ as long as $\mu_e \leq 2^{R_b - R_s} - 1$. Thus, the feasible range of the security constraint in Scenario 1 is given by

$$0 \leq \epsilon \leq 1. \quad (26)$$

Hence, any required reliability and security constraints are feasible by appropriately adjusting the on-off thresholds. It is noted that perfect secrecy, i.e., $\epsilon = 0$, can be achieved.

The following proposition summarizes the solution to the design problem in Scenario 1, where the optimal μ_b is expressed in a closed form and the optimal μ_e is obtained by numerically solving an equation.

Proposition 1: The optimal parameters of the throughput-maximizing transmission scheme in Scenario 1 are given as follows:

$$\mu_b = \begin{cases} 2^{R_b} - 1, & \text{if } R_b \leq \log_2\left(1 + \frac{(1 - \beta_b)\delta}{\beta_b(1 - \delta)}\right), \\ (2^{R_b} - 1) \left(1 - P_b\beta_b \ln\left(\delta \frac{1 + \beta_b(2^{R_b} - 2)}{\beta_b(2^{R_b} - 1)}\right)\right), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (27)$$

$$\mu_e = \begin{cases} +\infty, & \text{if } \frac{1 - \beta_e}{1 + \beta_e(2^{R_b - R_s} - 2)} \exp\left(-\frac{2^{R_b - R_s} - 1}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right) \leq \epsilon, \\ F_1, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (28)$$

where F_1 is the solution of μ_e to the equation

$$\begin{aligned}
\epsilon &= \frac{\frac{1 - \beta_e}{1 + \beta_e(2^{R_b - R_s} - 2)} \exp\left(-\frac{2^{R_b - R_s} - 1}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right) - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right)}{1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right)} \\
&\quad + \frac{\frac{\beta_e(2^{R_b - R_s} - 1)}{1 + \beta_e(2^{R_b - R_s} - 2)} \exp\left(\frac{1}{P_e} \left(\frac{1}{\beta_e} - \frac{\mu_e}{1 - \beta_e} - \frac{\mu_e}{\beta_e(2^{R_b - R_s} - 1)}\right)\right)}{1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right)}. \quad (29)
\end{aligned}$$

The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix A.

B. Scenario Two

Derivations of p_{tx} , p_{co} and p_{so} : The derivations of the probability of transmission and the connection outage probability in Scenario 2 are the same as (19) and (21) in Scenario 1, respectively. The secrecy outage probability in Scenario 2 is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
p_{so} &= \Pr(C_e > R_b - R_s \mid \hat{\gamma}_e < \mu_e) \\
&= \Pr(\log_2(1 + \gamma_e) > R_b - R_s \mid \hat{\gamma}_e < \mu_e) \\
&= \frac{\Pr(\gamma_e > 2^{R_b - R_s} - 1, \hat{\gamma}_e < \mu_e)}{\hat{\gamma}_e < \mu_e} \\
&= \frac{\int_0^{\mu_e} \left(\int_{2^{R_b - R_s} - 1}^{\infty} f_{\gamma_e|\hat{\gamma}_e}(\gamma_e|\hat{\gamma}_e) d\gamma_e \right) f_{\hat{\gamma}_e}(\hat{\gamma}_e) d\hat{\gamma}_e}{1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)}\right)}. \quad (30)
\end{aligned}$$

According to the definitions of γ_e and $\hat{\gamma}_e$ in Scenario 2, γ_e conditioned on its estimate, $\hat{\gamma}_e$, follows a non-central chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom. Applying the cumulative distribution function of the non-central chi-square distribution, we have

$$\int_{2^{R_b - R_s} - 1}^{\infty} f_{\gamma_e|\hat{\gamma}_e}(\gamma_e|\hat{\gamma}_e) d\gamma_e = Q_1\left(\sqrt{\frac{2\hat{\gamma}_e}{P_e\beta_e}}, \sqrt{\frac{2^{R_b - R_s} - 1}{P_e\beta_e}}\right), \quad (31)$$

where $Q_x(a, b)$ represents the Marcum Q-function [21]. Thus, the secrecy outage probability in Scenario 2 can be rewritten as

$$p_{so} = \frac{\int_0^{\mu_e} Q_1\left(\sqrt{\frac{2\hat{\gamma}_e}{P_e\beta_e}}, \sqrt{\frac{2^{R_b-R_s+1}-2}{P_e\beta_e}}\right) f_{\hat{\gamma}_e}(\hat{\gamma}_e) d\hat{\gamma}_e}{1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1-\beta_e)}\right)} \\ = \frac{\int_0^{\mu_e} \exp\left(-\frac{\hat{\gamma}_e}{P_e(1-\beta_e)}\right) Q_1\left(\sqrt{\frac{2\hat{\gamma}_e}{P_e\beta_e}}, \sqrt{\frac{2^{R_b-R_s+1}-2}{P_e\beta_e}}\right) d\hat{\gamma}_e}{P_e(1-\beta_e) \left(1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1-\beta_e)}\right)\right)}. \quad (32)$$

Feasibility of Constraints: Since the connection outage probability does not change from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2, the feasible range of the reliability constraint in Scenario 2 is identical to (25) in Scenario 1. Since p_{so} is an increasing function of μ_e and

$$\lim_{\mu_e \rightarrow 0} p_{so} = \Pr(C_e > R_b - R_s \mid \hat{\gamma}_e = 0) \\ = \Pr(\log_2(1 + \gamma_e) > R_b - R_s \mid \hat{\gamma}_e = 0) \\ = \int_{2^{R_b-R_s-1}}^{\infty} f_{\gamma_e|\hat{\gamma}_e=0}(\gamma_e | \hat{\gamma}_e = 0) d\gamma_e \\ = Q_1\left(0, \sqrt{\frac{2^{R_b-R_s+1}-2}{P_e\beta_e}}\right). \quad (33)$$

Thus, the feasible range of the security constraint is given as

$$Q_1\left(0, \sqrt{\frac{2^{R_b-R_s+1}-2}{P_e\beta_e}}\right) < \epsilon \leq 1. \quad (34)$$

Thus, any required reliability constraint is feasible, while the security constraint is feasible only when (34) is satisfied.

The following proposition summarizes the solution to the design problem in Scenario 2, where the optimal μ_b is expressed in a closed form and the optimal μ_e is obtained by numerically solving an equation.

Proposition 2: *The optimal parameters of the throughput-maximizing transmission scheme in Scenario 2 are given as follows:*

$$\mu_b = \begin{cases} 2^{R_b} - 1, & \text{if } R_b \leq \log_2\left(1 + \frac{(1-\beta_b)\delta}{\beta_b(1-\delta)}\right), \\ (2^{R_b} - 1) \left(1 - P_b\beta_b \ln\left(\delta \frac{1+\beta_b(2^{R_b}-2)}{\beta_b(2^{R_b}-1)}\right)\right), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (35)$$

$$\mu_e = \begin{cases} +\infty, & \text{if } \exp\left(-\frac{2^{R_b-R_s}-1}{P_e}\right) \leq \epsilon, \\ F_2, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (36)$$

where F_2 is the solution of μ_e to the equation

$$\epsilon = \frac{\int_0^{\mu_e} \exp\left(-\frac{\hat{\gamma}_e}{P_e(1-\beta_e)}\right) Q_1\left(\sqrt{\frac{2\hat{\gamma}_e}{P_e\beta_e}}, \sqrt{\frac{2^{R_b-R_s+1}-2}{P_e\beta_e}}\right) d\hat{\gamma}_e}{P_e(1-\beta_e) \left(1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_e}{P_e(1-\beta_e)}\right)\right)}. \quad (37)$$

The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix B. Note that the optimal μ_b in Scenario 2 is identical to that in Scenario 1.

Remark: According to (36) in Proposition 2, $\mu_e = \infty$ when

$$\exp\left(-\frac{2^{R_b-R_s}-1}{P_e}\right) \leq \epsilon \leq 1. \quad (38)$$

This indicates that Alice can ignore the feedback from Eve to design the system parameters when the security constraint satisfies (38). Therefore, the design problem in Scenario 2 is identical to the design problem in Scenario 3 when the security constraint satisfies (38).

C. Scenario Three

In Scenario 3, Alice does not have or trust the feedback from Eve. Thus, Alice decides whether or not transmit according to the information about Bob's estimated instantaneous SNR. Then, the on-off SNR threshold on Eve's channel, μ_e , does not exist, and there is only one parameter to design, i.e., μ_b .

Derivations of p_{tx} , p_{co} and p_{so} : The probability of transmission in Scenario 3 is given as

$$p_{tx} = \Pr(\hat{\gamma}_b > \mu_b) = \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_b}{P_b(1-\beta_b)}\right). \quad (39)$$

The derivation of the connection outage probability in Scenario 3 is identical to (21) in Scenarios 1 and 2. The secrecy outage probability in Scenario 3 is given by

$$p_{so} = \Pr(C_e > R_b - R_s) = \exp\left(-\frac{2^{R_b-R_s}-1}{P_e}\right). \quad (40)$$

Note that the secrecy outage probability in Scenario 3 is a constant value and uncontrollable. Thus, the security constraint is either always achievable or always unachievable no matter what the value of the design parameter is.

Feasibility of Constraints: Since the connection outage probability remains the same in Scenarios 1, 2 and 3, the feasible range of the reliability constraint in Scenario 3 is identical to (25) in Scenarios 1 and 2. Since the secrecy outage probability in Scenario 3 is not controllable, the feasible range of the security constraint in Scenario 3 is given by

$$\exp\left(-\frac{2^{R_b-R_s}-1}{P_e}\right) \leq \epsilon \leq 1. \quad (41)$$

Thus, any required reliability constraint is feasible, while the security constraint is feasible only when (41) is satisfied. Note that the lower bound of the feasible security constraint in this scenario is the same as (38) in the analysis for Scenario 2. This is because the design problems in Scenarios 2 and 3 are the same when (38) is satisfied.

The following proposition summarizes the solution to the design problem in Scenario 3.

Proposition 3: *The optimal parameter of the throughput-maximizing transmission scheme in Scenario 3 is given in (27).*

Remark: Comparing the optimal solutions of the design problems in the three different scenarios, we can find that the optimal solution of μ_b does not change in different scenarios, but the optimal solutions of μ_e are different in different scenarios. The reason for this is given as follows. In fact, for the three different scenarios, the assumptions on the channel knowledge of the legitimate link do not change, while the assumptions on the channel knowledge of the eavesdropping link are different. In addition, the legitimate and eavesdropping links are independent to each other. Therefore, intuitively, it is reasonable that we have the same solution of the optimal μ_b

and different solutions of the optimal μ_e in the three different scenarios.

D. Numerical Results

In this subsection, we present and compare the numerical results for the transmission schemes in the three different scenarios. The results shown in this subsection are all for networks with $R_b = 2$, $R_s = 1$ and $\delta = 0.1$.




Fig. 1. Scenario 1: Achievable throughput versus normalized pilot power. Results are shown for networks with different average received data SNRs at Bob, $P_b = 5$ dB, 10 dB, 15 dB, 20 dB. The other system parameters are $\delta = 0.1$, $\epsilon = 0.05$, $P_e = 0$ dB, $R_b = 2$, $R_s = 1$.




Fig. 2. Scenario 2: Achievable throughput versus normalized pilot power. Results are shown for networks with different average received data SNRs at Bob, $P_b = 5$ dB, 10 dB, 15 dB, 20 dB. The other system parameters are $\delta = 0.1$, $\epsilon = 0.05$, $P_e = 0$ dB, $R_b = 2$, $R_s = 1$.

Figs. 1 and 2 demonstrate the achievable throughput against the normalized pilot power for networks with different average received SNRs at Bob⁵ in Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively.

⁵The results with P_b equal to or smaller than P_e are not shown in the figures. When P_b is comparable or small than P_e , the achievable throughput is very small or reaches zero. In order to achieve better performance in such a scenario, one can consider multi-antenna transmissions or using external helpers to regain the relative advantage of the legitimate receiver's channel over the eavesdropper's channel, which is beyond the scope of this work.

The average received SNR at Eve, P_e , is fixed to 0 dB. Also, the reliability and security constraints are fixed. As shown in Fig. 1, when Bob's channel condition does not have a clear advantage against Eve's channel condition, e.g., $P_b = 5$ dB, the achievable throughput rises with the increase of the normalized pilot power all the time. However, when Bob's channel condition has a clear advantage against Eve's channel condition, the throughput does not always increase with the normalized pilot power. As the curves of $P_b = 10$ dB, 15 dB, 20 dB present, the throughput increases fast to a peak when the normalized pilot power increases to the optimal value. After achieving the peak value, the throughput decreases with the increase of the normalized pilot power. In addition, the optimal normalized pilot power becomes smaller as P_b increases. This observation suggests that when both Bob and Eve have imperfect channel estimation dependent on the training process, it is not always good to have more training power to get more accurate channel estimation even if the pilot power is obtained for free.

On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 2, the achievable throughput is a non-decreasing function of the normalized pilot power. In Scenario 2, Eve perfectly knows her own channel while Alice has the imperfect estimates of both Bob and Eve's channel qualities dependent on the training process. Thus, the increase of training power improves the transmitter's knowledge on both legitimate and eavesdropping channels, but has no influence on the eavesdropper's knowledge about her own channel. Moreover, we see that the minimum normalized pilot power of having a positive throughput is not related to P_b . From (10) and (34), the minimum normalized pilot power of having a positive throughput can be calculated as

$$\alpha = \frac{1 - F_3}{F_3 P_e} \quad (42)$$

where F_3 is the solution of β_e to the equation

$$Q_1 \left(0, \sqrt{\frac{2^{R_b - R_s + 1} - 2}{P_e \beta_e}} \right) = \epsilon. \quad (43)$$

Clearly, the above equations are not related to P_b .

Fig. 3 compares the achievable throughput in Scenarios 1, 2 and 3. There are three groups of curves representing the networks with three different values of normalized pilot power. As shown in the figure, under different security constraints, only Scenario 1 can always achieve positive throughput. This is because Alice and Eve have the same amount of knowledge about the eavesdropping channel in Scenario 1, and Alice in fact knows an upper bound of the actual instantaneous SNR at Eve ($\hat{\gamma}_e \geq \gamma_e$). On the other hand, Scenarios 2 and 3 can obtain positive throughput only when the security constraints are in the feasible ranges as formulated in (34) and (41), respectively. Since the controllable parameter is not related to the security performance of networks in Scenario 3, the throughput is equal to either 0 (when the security constraint is not feasible, e.g., $0 \leq \epsilon \leq 0.37$ in Fig. 3) or a positive constant value (when the security constraint is feasible, e.g., $0.37 < \epsilon \leq 1$ in Fig. 3). Thus, the throughput of each network in Scenario 3 is a step function of the security constraint. In addition, when the




Fig. 3. Comparison of the three scenarios: Achievable throughput versus security constraint. Results are shown for networks with different values of normalized pilot power, $\alpha = 1, 5, \infty$. The other system parameters are $P_b = 10$ dB, $P_e = 0$ dB, $\delta = 0.1$, $R_b = 2$, $R_s = 1$. Note that the case of $\alpha = \infty$ is equivalent to having perfect channel estimation.

security constraint is sufficiently loose satisfying (38) or (41), networks in the three different scenarios can achieve the same throughput. Comparing Scenarios 1 and 2, we see that the difference of throughput between the two scenarios decreases, as the security constraint becomes loose. Besides, under a same security constraint, the throughput difference between networks in Scenarios 1 and 2 decreases with the increase of normalized pilot power. As presented by the case of $\alpha = \infty$, Scenarios 1 and 2 can achieve the same throughput when the channel is perfectly estimated.

IV. JOINT RATE AND ON-OFF TRANSMISSION DESIGN

As analyzed in Section III, for networks in Scenario 3, the security performance of the communication system is uncontrollable if we only consider the design of the on-off transmission parameters, i.e., the on-off thresholds. In order to control the security performance, in this section, we re-study the design problem in Scenario 3 considering the joint rate and on-off transmission design⁶. Unlike the on-off transmission design in Section III where the encoding rates, R_b and R_s , are fixed, in this section we allow more degrees of freedom such that R_b and R_s can be optimally chosen.

The design problem is to maximize the throughput, η , subject to two constraints, one on the security performance and the other on the reliability performance. In Scenario 3, Alice decides whether or not transmit according to the estimated instantaneous SNR at Bob, $\hat{\gamma}_b$. The design problem can be written as

$$\max_{\mu_b, R_b, R_s} \eta, \quad (44)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad p_{so} \leq \epsilon, p_{co} \leq \delta. \quad (45)$$

The controllable parameters to design are the codeword transmission rate, R_b , the confidential information rate, R_s , and the

⁶The joint rate and on-off transmission design for Scenarios 1 and 2 can be obtained in a similar way as presented in this section.

on-off SNR threshold on Bob's channel, μ_b . In the following, two different transmission schemes are derived, according to whether the encoding rates are non-adaptive or adaptive. The expression of the throughput, η , for each transmission scheme is provided in the corresponding subsection.

A. Non-Adaptive Rate Scheme

We first consider the non-adaptive rate scheme where the codeword transmission rate, R_b , and the confidential information rate, R_s , are both constant over time. The throughput for the non-adaptive rate scheme is given by

$$\eta = p_{tx}(1 - p_{co})R_s. \quad (46)$$

Derivations of p_{tx} , p_{co} and p_{so} : The probability of transmission is given in (39). The connection outage probability is given in (21). The secrecy outage probability is given in (40). Note that the security performance is controllable now, since R_b and R_s can be optimal chosen.

Feasibility of Constraints: Since p_{so} is independent of μ_b , the choice of μ_b does not affect p_{so} . Also, from (24), we can set μ_b sufficiently large to achieve any arbitrarily small p_{co} . Thus, the feasible range of the reliability constraint in the non-adaptive rate scheme is identical to (25). According to (40), p_{so} is a decreasing function of $R_b - R_s$ and

$$\lim_{R_b - R_s \rightarrow +\infty} p_{so} = 0. \quad (47)$$

Thus, the feasible range of the security constraint in the non-adaptive rate scheme is given by

$$0 < \epsilon \leq 1. \quad (48)$$

Note that any required reliability and security constraints are feasible by appropriately choosing R_b and R_s .

In Section III, p_{so} and p_{co} are independently controlled by different design parameters. However, in this section, the choices of encoding rates affect both the connection outage probability and the secrecy outage probability. In other words, with the encoding rates controllable, p_{so} and p_{co} are related by the rate parameters. For example, from the derivations of connection and secrecy outage probabilities, a smaller R_b allows us to achieve a smaller connection outage probability but may increase the secrecy outage probability. This enables a trade-off between the feasible reliability constraint and the feasible security constraint. To illustrate such a trade-off, we analyze the feasible constraints for the system with a given on-off threshold, μ_b . To satisfy $R_s > 0$ and $p_{so} \leq \epsilon$, we have $2^{R_b} - 1 > P_e \ln \epsilon^{-1}$. Also, from (20) and $p_{co} \leq \delta$, we have $2^{R_b} - 1 \leq \min \{\mu_b, F_4(\mu_b, \delta)\}$ where $F_4(\mu_b, \delta)$ is the positive solution of x to the equation

$$\mu_b = x \left(1 - P_b \beta_b \ln \left(\delta \frac{\beta_b x + 1 - \beta_b}{\beta_b x} \right) \right). \quad (49)$$

Thus, for any chosen value of μ_b , the feasible constraints for having secure communication with positive confidential information rate must satisfy

$$\exp \left(- \frac{\min \{\mu_b, F_4(\mu_b, \delta)\}}{P_e} \right) < \epsilon. \quad (50)$$

From (49), it is easy to see that $F_4(\mu_b, \delta)$ is an increasing function of δ . Thus, according to (50), the minimum feasible value of ϵ increases with the decrease of δ . In other words, if we set a stricter reliability constraint, the feasible security constraint becomes loose. Note that when the reliability constraint is sufficiently loose, $F_4(\mu_b, \delta)$ becomes always greater than μ_b , and (50) changes to

$$\exp\left(-\frac{\mu_b}{P_e}\right) < \epsilon. \quad (51)$$

The following proposition summarizes the solution to the design problem for the non-adaptive rate scheme, where each of the optimal μ_b and the optimal R_s is expressed as a closed-form function of R_b and the optimal R_b is obtained by numerically solving an optimization problem.

Proposition 4: The optimal parameters of the throughput-maximizing transmission scheme with non-adaptive rates are given as follows:

$$\mu_b = \begin{cases} 2^{R_b} - 1, & \text{if } R_b \leq \log_2\left(1 + \frac{(1-\beta_b)\delta}{\beta_b(1-\delta)}\right), \\ (2^{R_b} - 1)\left(1 - P_b\beta_b \ln\left(\delta \frac{1+\beta_b(2^{R_b}-2)}{\beta_b(2^{R_b}-1)}\right)\right), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (52)$$

$$R_s = R_b - k, \quad \text{where } k = \log_2(1 + P_e \ln \epsilon^{-1}). \quad (53)$$

R_b is obtained by solving the problem given as

$$\max_{R_b} (R_b - k) \exp\left(-\frac{\mu_b}{P_b(1-\beta_b)}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{\beta_b(2^{R_b}-1)}{1+\beta_b(2^{R_b}-2)} \exp\left(\frac{1}{P_b\beta_b} \left(1 - \frac{\mu_b}{2^{R_b}-1}\right)\right)\right), \quad (54)$$

$$\text{s.t. } k < R_b <$$

$$\max\left\{\log_2\left(1 + \frac{(1-\beta_b)\delta}{\beta_b(1-\delta)}\right), k + \frac{1}{\ln 2} W(2^{-k} P_b(1-\beta_b))\right\}, \quad (55)$$

where $W(\cdot)$ is the Lambert W function and μ_b is a function of R_b whose expression is formulated as (52).

The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix C

B. Adaptive Rate Scheme

Now, we consider the scenario where the codeword transmission rate, R_b , and the confidential information rate, R_s , can be adaptively chosen according to the estimated Bob's instantaneous SNR. Since the confidential information rate, R_s , is adaptively chosen according to any given $\hat{\gamma}_b$, the throughput for the adaptive rate scheme is given by

$$\eta = \int_{\mu_b}^{\infty} (1 - p_{co}) R_s f_{\hat{\gamma}_b}(\hat{\gamma}_b) d\hat{\gamma}_b. \quad (56)$$

The lower limit of the integral in (56) is equal to μ_b , since the transmission takes place only when $\hat{\gamma}_b > \mu_b$ due to the on-off transmission scheme.

Then, we consider the design problem of finding the values of R_b , R_s and μ_b that maximize the throughput. Since R_b and R_s can be adaptively chosen according to any given $\hat{\gamma}_b$, we treat this design as a two-step optimization problem given by

Step 1: For any given $\hat{\gamma}_b$ ($\hat{\gamma}_b > \mu_b$), solve

$$\max_{R_b, R_s} (1 - p_{co}) R_s, \quad (57)$$

$$\text{s.t. } p_{so} \leq \epsilon, p_{co} \leq \delta. \quad (58)$$

Step 2: Choose the best μ_b to maximize the overall throughput averaged over $\hat{\gamma}_b$.

Note that the optimal R_b and R_s are obtained in Step 1 for a given value of $\hat{\gamma}_b$. Thus, the following calculations of connection and secrecy outage probabilities are conditioned on a given $\hat{\gamma}_b$.

Derivations of p_{co} and p_{so} : Since $\gamma_b \leq \hat{\gamma}_b$ and Bob can decode the message without error only when $C_b \geq R_b$, it is wise to choose the value of R_b satisfying $R_b \leq \log_2(1 + \hat{\gamma}_b)$. Then, for any given $\hat{\gamma}_b$, the connection outage probability can be computed as

$$\begin{aligned} p_{co} &= \Pr(\log_2(1 + \gamma_b) < R_b \mid \hat{\gamma}_b) \\ &= \Pr\left(\log_2\left(1 + \frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{\hat{\gamma}_b + 1}\right) < R_b \mid \hat{\gamma}_b\right) \\ &= \Pr\left(\tilde{\gamma}_b > \frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{2^{R_b} - 1} - 1 \mid \hat{\gamma}_b\right) \\ &= \exp\left(-\frac{1}{P_b\beta_b} \left(\frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{2^{R_b} - 1} - 1\right)\right). \end{aligned} \quad (59)$$

The secrecy outage probability does not change from the non-adaptive rate scheme given in (40).

Feasibility of Constraints: According to (59), we have

$$\hat{\gamma}_b \rightarrow \infty \Rightarrow p_{co} \rightarrow 0 \quad (60)$$

Since p_{so} is independent of μ_b , the choice of μ_b does not affect p_{so} . Also, we can set μ_b sufficiently large such that transmission happens only when $\hat{\gamma}_b$ is sufficiently large to achieve any arbitrarily small p_{co} . Therefore, it is feasible to have $\delta \rightarrow 0$. Thus, the feasible range of the reliability constraint is the same as (25). For the same reason described in the non-adaptive rate scheme, the feasible range of the security constraint is identical to (48). Therefore, any required reliability and security constraints are feasible by appropriately choosing R_b and R_s .

The following proposition summarizes the solution to the design problem for the adaptive rate scheme, where the optimal μ_b is given by a closed-form solution, the optimal R_s is expressed as a closed-form function of R_b and the optimal R_b is obtained by numerically solving an optimization problem.

Proposition 5: The optimal parameters of the throughput-maximizing transmission scheme with adaptive rates are given as follows:

$$\mu_b = (1 + P_b\beta_b \ln \delta^{-1}) P_e \ln \epsilon^{-1}. \quad (61)$$

$$R_s = R_b - k, \quad \text{where } k = \log_2(1 + P_e \ln \epsilon^{-1}). \quad (62)$$

R_b is obtained by solving the problem given by

$$\max_{R_b} (R_b - k) \left(1 - \exp\left(-\frac{1}{P_b\beta_b} \left(1 - \frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{2^{R_b} - 1}\right)\right)\right), \quad (63)$$

$$\text{s.t. } k < R_b \leq \log_2\left(1 + \frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{1 + P_b\beta_b \ln \delta^{-1}}\right). \quad (64)$$

The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix D.

Remark: From Proposition 5, one can further obtain that the optimal R_b is equal to either the upper bound of R_b , i.e., $R_b = \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{1 + P_b \beta_b \ln \delta^{-1}} \right)$, or the solution of R_b to the equation

$$\frac{dI(R_b)}{dR_b} = 0 \quad (65)$$

where $I(R_b) = (R_b - k) \left(1 - \exp \left(\frac{1}{P_b \beta_b} \left(1 - \frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{2^{R_b-1}} \right) \right) \right)$. Note that when $\beta_b = 0$, Proposition 5 implies that $R_b = \log_2(1 + \gamma_b)$. This is consistent with the optimal solution of R_b in the absence of the estimation error, where the optimal codeword rate matches the capacity of Bob's channel.

C. Numerical Results

In this subsection, we show the numerical results for the joint rate and on-off transmission design. The results demonstrated in this subsection are obtained with $P_b = 10$ dB and $P_e = 0$ dB.




Fig. 4. Feasible security constraint versus feasible reliability constraint for non-adaptive rate scheme with a given on-off threshold. Results are shown for networks with different values of normalized pilot power, i.e., $\alpha = 1, 5, \infty$. The other system parameters are $\mu_b = 9$, $P_b = 10$ dB, $P_e = 0$ dB.

Fig. 4 illustrates the trade-off between the feasible reliability constraint and the feasible security constraint for the non-adaptive rate scheme with a given on-off threshold. The networks with different values of normalized pilot power are represented by different curves. For each network, the feasible constraints lie in the region above the corresponding curve. As depicted in the figure, when the reliability constraint goes loose (as δ increases), the network can achieve stricter security constraint (as a smaller ϵ is achievable). The lower bound on the feasible value of ϵ is related to the on-off SNR threshold as given in (51). Comparing the curves, we see that the network with relatively large normalized pilot power can achieve relatively strict security constraint subject to the same reliability constraint.

Fig. 5 demonstrates the achievable throughput over a range of security constraints for networks with different normalized pilot power values. The curves representing non-adaptive and adaptive rate schemes are distinguished by different line styles.




Fig. 5. Achievable throughput versus security constraint. Results are shown for networks with different values of normalized pilot power, i.e., $\alpha = 1, 5$. The other system parameters are $\delta = 0.1$, $P_b = 10$ dB, $P_e = 0$ dB.

Besides, the reliability constraint is fixed to $\delta = 0.1$. As shown in the figure, the achievable throughput rises with the increase of the normalized pilot power. We see that adaptively changing the encoding rates significantly improves the achievable throughput compared with the non-adaptive rate scheme. In addition, compared with the on-off transmission design with fixed rates in Section III, the joint rate and on-off transmission design significantly improves the achievable throughput subject to any given security constraint. For example, the on-off transmission design with fixed $R_b = 2$ and $R_s = 1$ cannot achieve a positive throughput value subject to the security constraint $\epsilon \leq 0.37$ as shown in Fig. 3, while the joint rate and on-off transmission design can always achieve a positive throughput value subject to any security constraint.




Fig. 6. Achievable security constraint versus normalized pilot power. Results are shown for networks with different target throughput values, i.e., $\eta = 0.2, 0.5$. The other system parameters are $\delta = 0.1$, $P_b = 10$ dB, $P_e = 0$ dB.

Fig. 6 shows the effect of increasing the normalized pilot power on the achievable security level of networks with different target throughput values. The curves representing

non-adaptive and adaptive rate schemes are distinguished by different line styles. As the figure presents, the networks can achieve stricter security constraint with the increase of normalized pilot power. By observing the slopes of curves, we find that the improvement of increasing the pilot power on the achievable security level is significant when the normalized pilot power is small. However, further increasing the pilot power can obtain very little benefit when the pilot power has already become large.

V. CONCLUSIONS

In this work, we presented a comprehensive study of secure transmission design in quasi-static slow fading channels with channel estimation errors. For systems with fixed encoding rates, throughput-maximizing on-off transmission schemes were proposed for scenarios with different assumptions on the channel knowledge. For systems with encoding rates controllable, we derived both non-adaptive and adaptive rate transmission schemes which jointly optimize the rate parameters and the on-off thresholds. Our analytical and numerical results illustrated how the optimal design and the achievable throughput vary with the change in the channel knowledge assumptions. Moreover, we found that increasing the pilot power for more accurate channel estimation can harm the throughput of secure transmission when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper obtain imperfect channel estimates.

APPENDIX A

Proof of Proposition 1: We first derive the optimal μ_b in Scenario 1. One can find that $\mu_b = 2^{R_b} - 1$ is the only solution of μ_b to the equation

$$\frac{\partial \eta(\mu_b, \mu_e)}{\partial \mu_b} = 0 \quad (66)$$

and

$$\frac{\partial^2 \eta(2^{R_b} - 1, \mu_e)}{\partial \mu_b^2} < 0. \quad (67)$$

Thus, if we ignore the possible bound of μ_b , the optimal μ_b is equal to $2^{R_b} - 1$. However, to satisfy the reliability constraint, $p_{co} \leq \delta$, there exists a possible lower bound of μ_b given by

$$\mu_b \geq (2^{R_b} - 1) \left(1 - P_b \beta_b \ln \left(\delta \frac{1 + \beta_b(2^{R_b} - 2)}{\beta_b(2^{R_b} - 1)} \right) \right). \quad (68)$$

Considering the lower bound, the optimal μ_b in Scenario 1 is formulated as (27) in Proposition 1.

Then, we derive the optimal μ_e in Scenario 1. Since p_{tx} is an increasing function of μ_e and p_{co} is independent of μ_e , it is optimal to maximize μ_e while satisfying the security constraint $p_{so} \leq \epsilon$. From the definition of p_{so} , one can find that p_{so} is an increasing function of μ_e . Thus, there is only one or no solution of μ_e to the equation

$$p_{so}(\mu_e) = \epsilon \quad (69)$$

where the expression of p_{so} is given as (23). When

$$\Pr(C_e > R_b - R_s) \leq \epsilon$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{1 - \beta_e}{1 + \beta_e(2^{R_b - R_s} - 2)} \exp \left(-\frac{2^{R_b - R_s} - 1}{P_e(1 - \beta_e)} \right) \leq \epsilon, \quad (70)$$

there is no solution of μ_e to (69), which means that there is no need to set an on-off SNR threshold on $\hat{\gamma}_e$ for the system (the required security constraint is always achievable) or equivalently $\mu_e = \infty$. Otherwise, there exists one and only one solution of μ_e to (69), which is the optimal value of μ_e to the maximization problem. Although it is difficult to obtain a closed-form solution of μ_e , this problem can be easily solved numerically. Thus, the optimal μ_e in Scenario 1 is formulated as (28) in Proposition 1. ■

APPENDIX B

Proof of Proposition 2: The optimal μ_b in Scenario 2 is the same as that in Scenario 1 and the proof of it is identical to the corresponding part in the proof of Proposition 1. Now, we derive the optimal μ_e in Scenario 2. Since p_{tx} is an increasing function of μ_e and p_{co} is independent of μ_e , it is optimal to maximize μ_e while satisfying the security constraint $p_{so} \leq \epsilon$. From the definition of p_{so} , one can find that p_{so} is an increasing function of μ_e . Thus, there is only one or no solution of μ_e to the equation

$$p_{so}(\mu_e) = \epsilon \quad (71)$$

where the expression of p_{so} is given as (32). When

$$\Pr(C_e > R_b - R_s) \leq \epsilon \Leftrightarrow \exp \left(-\frac{2^{R_b - R_s} - 1}{P_e} \right) \leq \epsilon, \quad (72)$$

there is no solution of μ_e to (71), which means that there is no need to set an on-off SNR threshold on $\hat{\gamma}_e$ for the system (the required security constraint is always achievable) or equivalently $\mu_e = \infty$. Otherwise, there exists one and only one solution of μ_e to (71), which is the optimal value of μ_e to the maximization problem. Although it is difficult to obtain a closed-form solution of μ_e , this problem can be easily solved numerically. Therefore, the optimal μ_e in Scenario 2 is formulated as (36) in Proposition 2. ■

APPENDIX C

Proof of Proposition 4: The proof of the optimal μ_b for the non-adaptive scheme is identical to the proof of optimal μ_b in Section III. Now, we prove the optimal R_s for any chosen R_b as follows. Since p_{tx} and p_{co} are independent of R_s , it is optimal to maximize R_s . Thus, we obtain the optimal R_s while satisfying $p_{so} \leq \epsilon$ as (53) in Proposition 4. Then, we prove the optimal R_b . Since $R_s > 0$, we have $R_b > k$. It is easy to prove that when

$$R_b \geq \max \left\{ \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{(1 - \beta_b)\delta}{\beta_b(1 - \delta)} \right), k + \frac{1}{\ln 2} W(2^{-k} P_b(1 - \beta_b)) \right\}, \quad (73)$$

the value of η is a decreasing function of R_b , i.e.,

$$\frac{\partial \eta(\mu_b, R_b)}{\partial R_b} < 0. \quad (74)$$

Therefore, the optimal R_b can be obtained by solving the optimization problem given in Proposition 4. ■

APPENDIX D

Proof of Proposition 5: The proof of the optimal R_s for the adaptive rate scheme is identical to the corresponding part in the proof of Proposition 4. Now, we derive the optimal R_b . To satisfy $R_s > 0$ and $p_{co} \leq \delta$, we obtain the lower and upper bounds of R_b given by $R_b > k$ and $R_b \leq \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{1 + P_b \beta_b \ln \delta^{-1}} \right)$. Thus, the optimal R_b can be obtained by solving the optimization problem given in Proposition 5. Then, we derive the optimal μ_b . To derive the optimal, μ_b , we start from looking for the range of $\hat{\gamma}_b$ in which it is possible to have secure communication with positive confidential information rate while satisfying both constraints. Let the lower bound of R_b be less than the upper bound of R_b , we can find the feasible range of $\hat{\gamma}_b$ as

$$\log_2 (1 + P_e \ln \epsilon^{-1}) < \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{\hat{\gamma}_b}{1 + P_b \beta_b \ln \delta^{-1}} \right) \\ \Leftrightarrow \hat{\gamma}_b > (1 + P_b \beta_b \ln \delta^{-1}) P_e \ln \epsilon^{-1}. \quad (75)$$

Therefore, the optimal μ_b is equal to the lower bound of the feasible $\hat{\gamma}_b$, given by (61). ■

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